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Abstract 
Studies on joint task performance have proposed that co-acting individuals co-represent the 
shared task context, which implies that actors integrate their co-actor’s task components into 
their own task representation as if they were all their own task.  This proposal has been 
supported by results of joint tasks in which each actor is assigned a single response where 
selecting a response is equivalent to selecting an actor.  The present study used joint task 
switching, which has previously shown switch costs on trials following the actor’s own trial 
(intrapersonal switch costs) but not on trials that followed the co-actor’s trial (interpersonal 
switch costs), suggesting that there is no task co-representation.  We examined whether 
interpersonal switch costs can be obtained when action selection and actor selection are 
confounded as in previous joint task studies.  The present results confirmed this prediction, 
demonstrating that switch costs can occur within a single actor as well as between co-actors 
when there is only a single response per actor, but not when there are two responses per actor.  
These results indicate that task co-representation is not necessarily implied even when effects 
occur across co-acting individuals and that how the task is divided between co-actors plays an 
important role in determining how the actors represent the divided task components. 
 
Keywords: Joint task switching; co-representation; division of labor; action representation; 
response selection. 
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A successful completion of a joint task requires both the division of labor between co-
acting individuals and the integration of divided task components into the individuals’ task 
representations.  The integration of divided components of the task is advantageous in a joint 
task setting because the mutual understandings of the current states of the co-actors allow 
each actor to monitor what their co-actors are doing and how they are doing it.  The 
integration would be necessary especially under a condition for which precise coordination of 
co-actors’ actions is crucial for a successful completion of a task (e.g., pair skating or rowing 
a boat). In previous studies of joint performance, there have been strong emphases on the 
integration of divided task components into a single mental representation.  The resulting 
representation, or the act of creating such a representation, is termed co-representation 
(Sebanz, Konblich, & Prinz, 2003).  Nevertheless, little has been said about the division of 
labor in a joint task.  The division of labor enables each actor to concentrate on their own 
components of the task, while their co-actors work on other parts independently (Yamaguchi, 
Clarke, & Egan, 2018).  It reduces workloads of individual actors, in a way that allows 
individual actors to complete their parts to a higher standard.  In organizational contexts, the 
division of labor also allows individuals to be specialized in areas of their expertise 
(Moreland, 1999).  The division of labor and the integration of divided task components are 
both important factors in a joint task, but they also provide two opposing forces: the former 
promotes independence and autonomy of individual actors, whereas the latter facilitates 
interplay and coordination between actors.  The question of how these two forces operate in a 
joint task setting is of central importance when understanding the nature of collective 
behaviors.  The purpose of the present study was to investigate what factors contribute to the 
balance between the division of labor and the integration of divided task components in a 
joint task setting. 
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In the last decade, joint task performance has been studied in various task settings that 
are used traditionally to investigate cognitive processes and representations underlying 
individuals’ performance.  These tasks include the Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003), flanker 
task (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2014), Stroop task (Saunders, Melcher, & van Zoest, 
2018; Yamaguchi, Clarke, & Egan, 2018), and task switching (Yamaguchi, Wall, & Hommel, 
2017b), among others.  The integration of co-actors’ tasks was highlighted especially in the 
results of the joint version of the Simon task, called the joint Simon task.  In the original 
version of the Simon task that is performed by individual actors, actors press left and right 
response keys to non-spatial aspects of stimuli (e.g., color) while they are encouraged to 
ignore stimulus locations.  However, responses are still faster and often more accurate when 
stimulus and response locations are compatible than when they are incompatible, which is 
known as the Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967).  In the joint version of the Simon task 
(Sebanz et al., 2003), two actors are assigned two different responses that are mapped to two 
different stimuli.  For instance, one actor presses a left key to green circles while the other 
actor presses a right key to red circles.  Green and red circles appear in a random order, and 
each actor decides whether it is their turn to make a response, according to the stimulus 
presented on that trial.  Hence, for each of the actors, the joint Simon task is essentially a 
go/nogo version of the Simon task, which usually produces no Simon effect when the task is 
performed alone (Hommel, 1996).  When two actors perform the joint version of the go/nogo 
Simon task, the Simon effect is still obtained. 
The occurrence of the joint Simon effect has inspired researchers to argue that two 
actors share a mental representation of the task when performing a joint task (Sebanz et al., 
2003).  This co-representation integrates two divided components of the Simon task into a 
whole representation that is equivalent to the original Simon task performed by single actors, 
and it provides the basis of spatial stimulus-response compatibility, producing the Simon 
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effect in the joint setting.  The co-representation account has been the major theoretical 
vehicle to interpret joint performance in the Simon and similar tasks in the past decade (e.g., 
Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Atmaca, Sebanz, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008; Demiral, 
Gambi, Nieuwland, & Pickering, 2016), although other alternative accounts have also been 
proposed recently (e.g., Dittrich, Dolk, Rothe-Wulf, Klauer, & Prinz, 2013; Dolk, Hommel, 
Colzato, et al., 2014; Prinz, 2015; Wenke et al., 2011).   
The co-representation account emphasizes the integration of divided task components, 
which is useful when two actors must coordinate their actions and achieve a cohesion in their 
collective behavior.  Nevertheless, it can also introduce conflict between the motor 
programmes representing the actor’s own action and the co-actor’s action (Sebanz, Knoblich, 
Prinz, & Wascher, 2006).  Such conflict would not occur if the actors only consider their own 
components of the task, which would be achieved by dividing the labor of the task.  
Therefore, there is a cost of integrating the co-actor’s share of the task into one’s own task 
representation. It should also be noted that a number of findings in recent studies are 
inconsistent with the central premise of the co-representation account.  For instance, in a joint 
task, the co-representation account proposes that the actors represent their co-actor’s actions 
automatically as if they were their own actions (Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006), which implies that the actors would perform all trials (physically 
or mentally) as if they were all their own trials.  However, participants are sensitive only to 
the proportions of compatible and incompatible trials in their own part, but not the 
proportions of these trials in their co-actor’s part in the joint Simon task (Yamaguchi, Wall, 
& Hommel, 2018).  Such a finding suggests that the actors represent their co-actor’s trials 
differently from their own trials.  More important to the present context, when each of the 
actors performs two different tasks that are administered in an unpredictable order, costs of 
switching between the two different tasks (switch costs) are obtained only if the previous trial 
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is performed by the same actor as the current actor but not if it is performed by a different 
actor (i.e., by the co-actor; Wenke et al., 2011; Yamaguchi, Wall, & Hommel, 2017a; 
Yamaguchi et al., 2017b).  This finding suggests that the actors do not represent their co-
actor’s trials in the same manner as they represent their own trials (also see Dolk, Hommel, 
Colzato, et al, 2014; Saunders et al., 2018, for evidence against co-representation in other 
task settings).  These recent observations are indicative of the division of labor between co-
actors; the actors are concerned only with their own parts of the task.   
It is puzzling that the joint Simon task supports the integration of task components 
into a shared mental representation, whereas other tasks such as joint task switching and joint 
Stroop task support the division of labor between co-actors.  One of the possible factors that 
might contribute to the discrepancy is the way by which a shared task is divided between co-
acting individuals.  The joint Simon task assigns a single response to each actor, in such a 
way that the presentation of a target stimulus is sufficient to determine which actor is 
responsible for a given trial.  This would mean that it is only after the correct response is 
determined when an actor to perform the trial is known.  Thus, response selection and actor 
selection are confounded in this situation, and any factors that influence actor selection (e.g., 
similarity between co-actors) could also influence response selection, even though the Simon 
effect is thought to arise from response selection (e.g., Hommel, 1995; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 
2012).  Joint task-switching of our previous studies assigned two alternative responses to 
each actor (Yamaguchi et al., 2017a, 2017b), and actors would first have to determine 
whether it is their turn to respond or their partner’s before they decide which response is the 
correct one.  Actor selection and response selection are separated in this situation, and factors 
that influence actor selection could not affect response selection (i.e., switch costs) in this 
setting.  Therefore, the number of responses assigned to co-actors may determine whether co-
actors co-represent a shared task or divide the labor of the task.   
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The present study tested this hypothesis in the context of joint task switching, based 
on our previous studies that provided evidence for the division of labor (i.e., no co-
representation; Yamaguchi et al., 2017b).  In this procedure, actors had to make responses to 
the target stimuli based on either the color of the stimuli (color task) or the shape of the 
stimuli (shape task).  A task cue was provided at the beginning of a trial to indicate which 
task the actors were to perform.  There were two task cues for each task (COLOUR and HUE 
for the color task, and SHAPE and FORM for the shape task; Logan & Bundesen, 2003).  On 
some trials, the task cue was the same as that presented on the preceding trial (cue-repeat 
trials); on other trials, the task cue was different from that on the preceding trial but the task 
was the same (e.g., COLOUR followed by HUE, or SHAPE followed by FORM; cue-switch 
trials); and on still other trials, the task cue and the task differed from those on the preceding 
trial (e.g., COLOUR followed by SHAPE, or HUE followed by FORM; task-switch trails).  
The difference between cue-repeat and cue-switch trials reflects the effect of switching task 
cues without switching tasks (cue-switch cost); the difference between cue-switch and task-
switch trials reflects the effect of switching tasks (task-switch cost). 
In a joint version of this procedure, two actors performed these tasks together.  Each 
of the two actors were assigned two responses that were mapped to two possible target 
stimulus values in each task (red vs. green for the color task, and square vs. diamond for the 
shape task).  The actors were also provided with an actor cue that occurred simultaneously 
with the target, indicating which actor to perform the task.  In this setting, there were switch 
costs when the actor also performed the preceding trial (actor repeat trials) but not when 
their co-actor performed the preceding trials (actor switch trials).  The result indicated that 
the actors represented their own trials differently from their co-actor’s trials.  This outcome 
implied that the actors did not co-represent their co-actor’s trials as if they were their own. 
This may be because the actors first had to determine whether it was their own trial or their 
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partner’s, and then determined which of the two alternative responses to make, given the 
target.  To examine this possibility, we carried out two experiments. 
In Experiment 1, a major modification from the previous study was the number of 
responses assigned to each actor: each actor had a single response that was mapped to one of 
the two possible targets in each task.  For example, one actor might be assigned a left 
response key that is mapped to green for the color task and to diamond for the shape task, 
whereas the other actor might be assigned a right response key that is mapped to red for the 
color task and to square for the shape task.  Under this condition, the actors could determine 
if the relevant target stimulus required the response assigned to them or the other response 
assigned to their partner.  Because the target determined which response to be made, this 
condition required no explicit actor cue to indicate who to perform the trial, unlike the 
previous studies.  Experiment 2 compared joint task switching with different numbers of 
responses assigned to each actor more directly.  Two groups of actors completed either joint 
task switching of Experiment 1 (with one response per actor) or joint task switching of our 
previous studies (with two responses per actor; Yamaguchi et al., 2017b, Experiment 1).  
Experiment 1  
 In the present experiment, a pair of actors performed two tasks jointly, such that each 
actor was assigned one of the two alternative responses in each of the two tasks that were 
intermixed randomly.  The target stimuli were colored shapes (green and red squares and 
diamonds), and one actor responded to one of the colors (e.g., green) and one of the shapes 
(square), whereas the other actor responded to the other color (red) and the other shape 
(diamond).  On each trial, the actors were instructed to respond to either the color or the 
shape of the target, and which actor responded on the trial depended on the relevant target 
stimulus.  For instance, in the color task, one actor responded to green squares and diamonds, 
and the other actor responded to red squares and diamonds; in the shape task, one actor 
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responded to green and red squares, and the other actor responded to green and red diamonds. 
There was no explicit ‘actor cue’ in addition to the target stimuli.    
The main purpose of the present experiment was to assess switch costs within 
individual actors (intrapersonal switch costs) and between co-actors (interpersonal switch 
costs).  The intrapersonal switch costs were examined by observing how task transition from 
the preceding trial influenced task performance on the current trial when the same actor 
performed both trials (actor repeat trials); the interpersonal switch costs were examined by 
observing how task transition influenced task performance when the actor performing the 
current trial differed from the actor who performed the preceding trial (actor switch trials).  In 
the previous joint switching studies with two responses per actor (Yamaguchi et al., 2017b), 
there were intrapersonal switch costs but no interpersonal switch costs.  In the current 
experiment with one response per actor, selecting a response was sufficient to determine the 
relevant actor on a given trial.  Hence, actor selection is confounded by response selection, 
just as in the joint Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003).  Each actor would select a response on 
every trial to decide whether they were to respond on a given trial.  Thus, we expected that 
there would be both intra- and interpersonal switch costs in the current experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty two undergraduate students (39 females, 3 undisclosed; mean age = 20.96, SD = 
6.73, range = 18-49) at Edge Hill University were recruited from two seminar groups of the 
introductory psychology module.  All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity and normal color vision.  They received experimental credits toward their module.  
They were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment.  The experimental protocol was 
approved by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee of Edge Hill University. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
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 The apparatus consisted of a 23-in widescreen monitor and a personal computer.  The 
target stimuli were squares (4.8 cm in side) and diamonds (i.e., squares tilted 45°), which 
were colored in green or red.  The targets were presented at the screen center.  The task cues 
were the words “COLOUR” and “HUE” for the color task, and “SHAPE” and “FORM” for 
the shape task, which were presented in the Courier New font at 36-pt.  The cues appeared 
6.8 cm above the screen center.  Responses were registered by pressing the ‘z’ and ‘/’ keys on 
a QWERTY desktop keyboard. 
Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted in two computer labs of the same room layout with 24 
seats arranged in four rows of six computers each, plus an instructor’s computer at the front 
end of the room.  The distance between two adjacent computers was about 160 cm.  There 
were at most three participant pairs in each row; pairs were seated at every other computer to 
avoid cluttering between pairs.  Two pairs used the instructor’s computers.  The experimenter 
randomly paired two students from different seminar groups, and each pair of participants 
used one computer and sat in front of the computer monitor.  Participants who sat on the left 
side placed their right index finger on the ‘z’ key, and those who sat on the right side placed 
their left index finger on the ‘/’ key.  Each participant read on-screen instructions that 
emphasized both speed and accuracy of responding.   
 Each participant performed two joint-task blocks, for which one participant responded 
to a subset of stimuli and another participant responded to another subset of stimuli, and one 
individual-task block, for which one participant responded to stimuli assigned to him or her 
and ignored other stimuli assigned to their co-actor; another participant remained inactive and 
only watched the trials.  Hence, there were two joint-task blocks and two individual-task 
blocks for each pair.  Each block consisted of 96 test trials, and there was a block of 16 
practice trials before the first joint-task block and before each of the two individual-task 
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blocks.  For some pairs, two joint-task blocks were administered first and then two 
individual-task blocks; for other pairs, two individual-task blocks were administered first and 
then two joint-task blocks.  The order of the joint- and individual-task blocks were 
determined randomly for each pair.  Within the individual-task blocks, the order of the actor 
performing the block was also determined randomly.   
In the color task, one participant responded to red stimuli, and another participant 
responded to green stimuli; in the shape task, one participant responded to squares, and 
another participant responded to diamonds.  The assignments of the colors and the shapes 
were counterbalanced across pairs.   
In the joint-task block, each trial started with a task cue that stayed on the screen for 
450 ms, followed by a 50-ms blank screen.  The target (colored square or diamond) appeared 
for 2000 ms or until a response was made.  If the correct response was made, a blank display 
replaced the stimulus and lasted for 1000 ms; otherwise, an error message was presented for 
1000 ms.  The message was “Error!” for an incorrect response and “Faster!” for no response.  
The next trial started with another task cue.  Response time (RT) was measured as the 
interval between onset of a target and a keypress. 
 The individual-task block was essentially the same, but participants were required to 
respond only when stimuli assigned to them were presented (go trials) but withhold 
responding when stimuli assigned to their co-actor were presented (nogo trials).  If no 
response was made on a go trial, the error message was “Respond!” If a response was made 
on a nogo trial, the error message was “Don’t respond!”  There was a 2000-ms window to 
respond on each trial.  
Design 
The independent variables included Block Type (joint-task block vs. individual-task 
block), Task Sequence (task-switch vs. cue-switch vs. cue-repeat), and Previous Trial Type 
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(go trial vs. nogo trial).  Task-switch referred to trials for which the current task was different 
from the task on the preceding trial; cue-switch referred to trials for which the current task 
was the same as the task on the preceding trial but the task-cue differed from the cue on the 
preceding trial; and cue-repeat referred to trials for which the current task and task-cue were 
the same as those on the preceding trial.  The three types of transition occurred with equal 
probability, determined randomly at the beginning of each trial.  The difference in 
performance between task-switch and cue-switch represents task-switch costs; the difference 
in performance between cue-switch and cue-repeat represents cue-switch costs.  With respect 
to Previous Trial Type for the joint-task condition, “go” refers to trials for which the 
preceding trial was performed by the same actor as the current trial (actor repeat in the joint 
task); “nogo” refers to trials for which the preceding trial was performed by a different actor 
(actor switch in the joint task).  
Results 
 Trials were discarded if RT was shorter than 200 ms or if there was no response 
(2.62% of all trials).  Mean RT for correct trials and percentages of error trials (PE) were 
computed for each participant.  RT and PE are summarized in Figure 1.  They were submitted 
to a 2 (Block Type: joint-task vs. individual-task) x 3 (Task Sequence: task-switch vs. cue-
switch vs. cue-repeat) x 2 (Previous Trial Type: go vs. nogo) ANOVA, with all variables 
being within-subject.  The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Response time 
 For RT, a significant main effect of Block Type reflected faster responses in the joint 
task (M = 502 ms) than in the individual task (M = 553 ms).  RT also depended on Previous 
Trial Type; responses were faster after go trials (M = 519 ms) than after nogo trials (M = 537 
ms).  There was a significant main effect of Task Sequence, which revealed that responses 
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were fastest for cue-repeat trials (M = 514 ms), intermediate for cue-switch trials (M = 520 
ms), and slowest for task-switch trials (M = 550 ms), yielding switch costs.   
Switch costs depended on Previous Trial Type. After go trials, responses were 
shortest for cue-repeat trials (M = 493 ms), intermediate for cue-switch trials (M = 518 ms), 
and longest for task-switch trials (M = 546 ms).  Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc multiple 
comparisons1 indicated that cue-repeat trials were significantly different from cue-switch 
trials (p = .047) and from task-switch trials (p < .001), but cue-switch and task-switch trials 
were not different (p = .179).  After nogo trials, RT was shorter for cue-switch trials (M = 522 
ms) than for cue-repeat trials (M = 535 ms); RT was still longest for task-switch trials (M = 
555 ms).  Bonferroni-adjusted multiple comparisons indicated that responses were 
significantly faster for cue-switch trails than for task-switch trials (p = .002) but were not 
different between cue-switch and cue-repeat trials (p = .542) or between cue-repeat and task-
switch trials (p = .179).  Therefore, there were task-switch costs both after go trials (when the 
same actor repeated) and after nogo trials (when actors switched), but cue-switch costs were 
obtained only after go trials but not after nogo trials.  Instead, responses were as slow for cue-
repeat trials as task-switch trials.   
Therefore, the RT data showed that the individual and joint tasks differed only with 
respect to the overall response speed, but there were no significant differences in terms of 
switch costs. As expected, there were switch costs after go trials (intrapersonal switch costs), 
which showed cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs; there were also switch costs after 
nogo trials (interpersonal switch costs) in the joint task, which showed task-switch costs but 
not cue-switch costs.     
Percentage of error trials 
                                                 
1 There were three combinations of task-switch, cue-switch, and cue-repeat.  Thus, p-values from paired-
samples t-test were multiplied by three with alpha = .05. 
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 For PE, a significant main effect of Block Type reflected more accurate responses in 
the individual task (M = 1.20%) than in the joint task (M = 8.61%).  PE also depended on 
Task Sequence, and Block Type modulated this effect.  PE was very small for the individual 
task to begin with, so there were little differences across the three type of trial transition (Ms 
= 1.37%, .80%. and 1.43%, for cue-repeat, cue-switch, and task-switch trials, respectively).  
For the joint task, PE was similar between cue-repeat (M = 7.24%) and cue-switch (M = 
7.12%), which were smaller than PE for task-switch (M = 11.50%).   
As in RT, switch costs depended on previous trial type.  After go trials, Bonferroni 
adjusted multiple comparisons showed that responses were more accurate on both cue-repeat 
and cue-switch trials than on task-switch trials (ps < .001), but the former two trials did not 
differ (p = 1).  After nogo trials, responses were more accurate on cue-switch trials than on 
task-switch trials, although the effect was only marginal statistically (p = .065).  Cue-repeat 
trials were not different from cue-switch or task-switch trials (p > .7).  
Therefore, the individual and joint tasks differed with respect to the overall error rates 
(more accurate in the individual task than in the joint task); together with the RT results, this 
outcome represents speed-accuracy trade-offs, whereby the actors were more cautious (i.e., 
slower and more accurate) in the individual task than in the joint task.  There were very small 
error rates in the individual task, so all significant effects were driven by the joint task.  And 
yet, PE data still showed switch costs after go trials (intrapersonal switch costs) and after 
nogo trials (interpersonal switch costs), although the latter was only marginal. 
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Table 1. Results of ANOVAs on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) in 
Experiment 1. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
  RT 
Block Type (BT)  1, 51 58,546.89 7.09 .010 .122 
Previous Trial (PT)  1, 51 11,276.09 4.67 .035 .084 
Task Sequence (TS)  2, 102 6,261.74 12.72 < .001 .200 
BT x PT  1, 51 11,333.04 2.09 .154 .039 
BT x TS  2, 102 5,830.89 2.27 .108 .043 
PT x TS  2, 102 6,703.09 3.37 .038 .062 
TB x PT x TS   2, 102 5,865.36 < 1 .458 .015 
  PE 
BT  1, 51 208.34 41.15 < .001 .447 
PT  1, 51 35.21 <1 .706 .003 
TS  2, 102 247.68 15.51 < .001 .233 
BT x PT  1, 51 33.74 < 1 .705 .003 
BT x TS  2, 102 31.50 8.74 < .001 .146 
PT x TS  2, 102 23.54 4.48 .014 .081 
BT x PT x TS   2, 102 28.87 1.68 .192 .032 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect at alpha = .05. 
 
Figure 1.  Mean response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) for individual and joint tasks 
of Experiment 1 (error bars represent one standard error of the mean). 
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Discussion 
 The present results demonstrated little differences between the individual and joint 
tasks, except for the overall response speed and error rates.  There appeared to be speed-
accuracy tradeoffs, as responses were faster but less accurate in the joint task than in the 
individual task.  In RT, there were intra- and interpersonal switch costs: switch costs were 
obtained when the same actor performed the preceding trial and the current trial, as well as 
when different actors performed these trials.  Importantly, given that there was no significant 
difference between the individual and joint tasks, the interpersonal switch costs cannot be 
attributed to co-representation per se.  In PE, there were much smaller error rates in the 
individual task than in the joint task, and any significant effects appear to have been driven 
by the latter task block.  The joint task still showed both intrapersonal and interpersonal 
switch costs, although the latter effect was only marginal.  The results are generally 
consistent with the prediction that, due to the confounding between actor selection and action 
selection, actors select a response to determine whether the trial was their own or their 
partner’s, which then led to the interpersonal switch costs.   
An interesting outcome of the present experiment is that although task-switch costs 
were obtained after go trials and after nogo trials, cue-switch costs occurred only after go 
trials but not after nogo trials.  In fact, responses were as slow and less accurate for cue-
repeat trials as task-switch trials after nogo trials.  This outcome may reflect binding between 
the response and the task cue on the preceding trial; that is, as the actor inhibited their 
response on the preceding trial, the inhibition was associated with the task cue, which then 
primed an inhibition of the response on the current trial when the task cue repeated.  A 
similar mechanism has been suggested in our previous study on the joint Simon task 
(Yamaguchi et al., 2018), in which we found sequential modulations of the Simon effect on 
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trials for which actors switched (after nogo trials); this interpersonal sequential modulation 
was also explained by binding of ‘nogo’ response to the stimulus location on the preceding 
trial.  It would be interesting to test this account more systematically in future investigations, 
but as this finding was not of central concern for present purposes we did not pursue it 
further.  Instead, in Experiment 2, we excluded cue-repeat trials to remove this possible 
binding effect.   
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 showed both intra- and interpersonal switch costs, which 
differed from our previous studies (Yamaguchi et al., 2017b, Experiment 1) in which switch 
costs were obtained within the same actor but not between co-actors.  A major discrepancy 
between the two experiments was the number of responses assigned to each actor.  The 
present experiment compared more directly between switch costs for different numbers of 
responses per actor. Two groups of actors performed two tasks as in Experiment 1, but one 
group was given one response per actor for each of the two tasks with no explicit actor cue 
(as in Experiment 1) and the other group was given two responses per actor for each of the 
two tasks with an explicit actor cue (as Experiment 1 of Yamaguchi et al., 2017b).  To avoid 
the possible binding effect after nogo trials suggested by the outcomes of Experiment 1, cue-
repeat trials were excluded in the present experiment.  It was expected that the one-response 
group would yield both intra- and interpersonal switch costs similarly, whereas the two-
response group would yield only intrapersonal switch costs but not interpersonal switch costs.   
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-six students (76 females; mean age = 19.53, SD = 4.99, range = 18-48) at Edge 
Hill University participated in the present experiment as part of the seminar activity in an 
introductory psychology module.  None had participated in Experiment 1, and they were 
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naïve as to the purpose of the experiment.  Participants received experimental credits toward 
their module for participation.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two groups 
(one-response group and two-response group) of an equal number (N = 48).  
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 The apparatus and stimuli were essentially the same as those used in Experiment 1: 
target stimuli were squares and diamonds in green or red, and the task cues were COLOUR, 
HUE, SHAPE, and FORM.  For the one-response group, response keys were the “z” key for 
one actor and the “3” key on the numeric pad for the other actor.  For the two-response group, 
they were the “z” and “c” keys for one actor and the “1” and “3” keys on the numeric pad for 
the other actor.  For the latter group, there was an additional ‘actor cue,’ which was the letter 
A or B superimposed on the target stimulus; this signaled an actor to make a response (see 
Yamaguchi et al., 2017b, for the same procedure).  
 The procedure closely followed Experiment 1 of the present study and that of our 
previous study (Yamaguchi et al., 2017b, Experiment 1).  Participants were randomly 
assigned to pairs and were allocated to either the one-response group or the two-response 
group.  The one-response group performed the same task as that of Experiment 1 of the 
present study, in which each actor was assigned one response key and responded by pressing 
the key only if one of the two target stimuli for a given task (shape or color) appeared on the 
screen.  The two-response group performed the task used in Experiment 1 of Yamaguchi et 
al. (2017b), in which each actor was assigned two response keys and responded by pressing 
either of the keys only if the actor cue indicated their trial.  The actor cue was the letter A for 
one actor or B for the other actor, which was superimposed on the target stimulus.  As in the 
previous experiments, each actor performed the joint task and the individual task.  The joint 
task started with a block of 16 practice trials, followed by two blocks of 120 test trials each; 
the individual task started with a block of 10 practice trials, followed by one block of 120 test 
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trials, for each actor.  As cue-repetition had caused slow responses after nogo trials in 
Experiment 1, cue-repeat trials were excluded, so task cue alternated every trial.  Cue-switch 
and task-switch trials occurred randomly with the probability of .5 each. 
Results 
 Trials were discarded based on the same criteria as those used in Experiment 1 
(3.00% of all trials), after removing one pair in the two-response group for whom more than 
50% of trials did not meet the criteria and had to be discarded.  Mean RT for correct trials and 
PE were computed in the same manner as before and were submitted to 2 (Block Type: joint-
task vs. individual-task) x 2 (Task Sequence: task-switch vs. cue-switch) x 2 (Previous Trial 
Type: go vs. nogo) x 2 (Number of Response: one-response vs. two-response) ANOVAs, 
with the first three variables being within-subject and the last variable being between-subject.  
The ANOVA results are summarized in Table 2, and RT and PE are shown in Figure 2. 
Response time 
 For RT, a significant main effect of Number of Response indicates that responses 
were faster for the one-response group (M = 580 ms) than for the two-response group (M = 
933 ms), which presumably reflected a need of response selection after actor selection in the 
latter but not in the former.  Significant main effects of Previous Trial Type and of Task 
Sequence reflect faster responses after go trials (M = 745 ms) than after nogo trials (M = 768 
ms), and for cue-switch trials (M = 750 ms) than for task-switch trials (M = 763 ms), 
respectively.  This switch cost depended on Block Type, Previous Trial Type, and Number of 
Response.   
To follow up the significant four-way interaction, RTs for the two groups were 
submitted to separate 2 (Block Type: joint-task vs. individual-task) x 2 (Task Sequence: task-
switch vs. cue-switch) x 2 (Previous Trial Type: go vs. nogo) ANOVAs.  For the one-
response group, the only significant effects were the main effects of Block Type, F(1, 47) = 
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4.52, MSE = 39414.35, p = .039, ηp2 = .088, and of Previous Trial Type, F(1, 47) = 4.80, MSE 
= 10583.96, p = .034, ηp2 = .093. Responses were faster in the joint task (M = 559 ms) than in 
the individual task (M = 602 ms), consistent with Experiment 1.  Responses were also faster 
after go trials (M = 569 ms) than after nogo trials (M = 592 ms).  Importantly, the main effect 
of Task Sequence did not reach significance, F(1, 47) = 3.38, MSE = 5414.15, p = .072, ηp2 = 
.062, although responses tended to be faster for cue-switch trials (M = 574 ms) than for task-
switch trials (M = 587 ms). The three-way interaction among Block Type, Previous Trial 
Type, and Task Sequence, was not significant either, F(1, 47) < 1, MSE = 5096.83, p = .344, 
ηp2 = .019.  Switch costs were 0 ms after go trials and 35 ms after nogo trials of the individual 
task, and –6 ms after go trials and –14 ms after nogo trials of the joint task.  
For the two-response group, there was a significant interaction between Previous Trial 
Type and Task Sequence, F(1, 45) = 9.56, MSE = 7699.30, p = .003, ηp2 = .175, and a 
significant three-way interaction among Block Type, Previous Trial Type, and Task 
Sequence, F(1, 45) = 4.46, MSE = 7903.77, p = .040, ηp2 = .090.  The former interaction 
reflected a larger switch cost after go trials (i.e., when the same actor performed the 
preceding trial; M = 41 ms) than after nogo trials (when the co-actor performed the preceding 
trial; M = –16 ms).  The latter interaction indicated that switch costs differed between after go 
trials and after nogo trials more in the individual task (Ms = 59 ms vs. –37 ms after go trials 
and after nogo trials, respectively) than in the joint task (Ms = 22 ms vs. 4 ms). Therefore, the 
results were generally consistent with the previous joint task switching study that showed 
intrapersonal switch costs but not interpersonal switch costs when there were two responses 
per actor, despite the reduction of switch costs in the joint task of the present experiment.  
Overall, the RT data showed different patterns of switch costs for the one-response 
group and for the two-response group.  Although switch costs were only marginal overall, the 
one-response group showed no difference between intra- and interpersonal switch costs. The 
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two-response group showed intrapersonal switch costs but not interpersonal switch costs, 
with some reduction in intrapersonal switch costs in the joint task. 
Percentage of error trials 
For PE, a significant main effect of Number of Response indicates that responses 
were also more accurate for the one-response group (M = 5.33%) than for the two-response 
group (M = 26.55%).  There was also a significant main effect of Block Type, reflecting more 
accurate responses in the individual task (M = 12.94%) than in the joint task (M = 18.93%), 
but this effect depended on Number of Response: responses were more accurate in the 
individual task (M = .36%) than in the joint task (M = 10.29%) for the one-response group, 
and there were smaller differences between the individual task (M = 25.53%) and the joint 
task (M = 27.57%) for the two-response group.  There was also a significant main effect of 
Task Sequence, showing more accurate responses for Cue-Switch trials (M = 14.40%) than 
for Task-Switch trials (M = 17.47%). This switch cost was modulated by a number of other 
factors, importantly by Block Type, Previous Trial Type, and Number of Response. 
As in RT, this four-way interaction was followed up by separate 2 (Block Type: joint-
task vs. individual-task) x 2 (Task Sequence: task-switch vs. cue-switch) x 2 (Previous Trial 
Type: go vs. nogo) ANOVAs for the one-response and two-response groups. For the one-
response group, there were significant main effects of Previous Trial Type, F(1, 47) = 20.24, 
MSE = 14.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .301, and of Block Type, F(1, 47) = 65.86, MSE = 14375, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .584. These variables also interacted, F(1, 47) = 11.53, MSE = 22.49, p = .001, ηp2 
= .197.  PE was lower for cue-switch trials (M = 4.46%) than for task-switch trials (M = 
6.20%), and it was very low in the individual task (M = .36%) as compared to the joint task 
(M = 10.29%).  Given the low PE, there was little difference between cue-switch trials (M = 
.31%) and task-switch trials (M = .41%) in the individual task, as opposed to a larger 
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difference between cue-switch trials (M = 8.60%) and task-switch trials (M = 11.99%) in the 
joint task.  No effect involving Previous Trial Type was significant, Fs < 1.9, ps > .174.  
For the two-response group, the main effect of Task Sequence was significant, F(1, 
45) = 11.66, MSE = 152.56, p = .001, ηp2 = .206, but this effect was modulated by Previous 
Trial Type, F(1, 45) = 9.84, MSE = 85.04, p = .003, ηp2 = .179, and by Previous Trial Type 
and Block Type, F(1, 45) = 4.13, MSE = 98.88, p = .048, ηp2 = .084.  For the individual task, 
switch costs were similar between trials after go trials (M = 6.05%) and trials after nogo trials 
(M = 4.22%), but for the joint task, switch costs were substantially reduced on trials after 
nogo trials (M = –1.47%) as compared to trials after go trials (M = 8.79%) than 
Overall, the PE data were consistent with RT, showing the differences between the 
one-response group and the two-response group in the patterns of switch costs.  For the one-
response group, responses were very accurate, but switch costs were obtained for the joint 
task regardless of the actor on the preceding trial (i.e., whether it was a go trial or a nogo 
trial).  For the two-response group, switch costs were obtained only when the preceding trial 
was a go trial but not when it was a nogo trial.  
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Table 2. Results of ANOVAs on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) in 
Experiment 2. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
   RT 
Between-subject       
 Number of Response (NR)  1, 92 23,285,027.96 182.99 < .001 .665 
Within-subject       
 Block Type (BT)  1, 92 34,923.53 3.06 .084 .032 
 BT x NR  1, 92 34,923.53 1.99 .162 .021 
 Previous Trial (PT)  1, 92 125,857.34 7.31 .008 .074 
 PT x NR  1, 92 125,857.34 < 1 .939 < .001 
 Task Sequence (TS)  1, 92 7,845.83 4.01 .048 .042 
 TS x NR  1, 92 7,845.83 < 1 .893 < .001 
 BT x PT  1, 92 9,404.55 1.41 .238 .015 
 BT x PT x NR  1, 92 9,404.55 < 1 .883 < .001 
 BT x TS  1, 92 6,419.93 < 1 .803 .001 
 BT x TS x NR  1, 92 6,419.93 < 1 .694 .002 
 PT x TS  1, 92 5,728.71 2.47 .119 .026 
 PT x TS x NR  1, 92 5,728.71 12.61 .001 .121 
 BT x PT x TS  1, 92 6,469.79 1.15 .286 .012 
  BT x PT x TS x NR   1, 92 6,469.79 5.11 .026 .053 
   PE 
Between-subject       
 Number of Response (NR)  1, 92 84,597.05 116.67 < .001 .559 
Within-subject       
 BT  1, 92 291.75 23.08 < .001 .201 
 TB x NR  1, 92 291.75 10.02 .002 .098 
 PT  1, 92 81.20 < 1 .352 .009 
 PT x NR  1, 92 81.20 2.08 .152 .022 
 TS  1, 92 82.00 21.61 < .001 .190 
 TS x NR  1, 92 82.00 4.04 .047 .042 
 BT x PT  1, 92 37.38 < 1 .614 .003 
 BT x PT x NR  1, 92 37.38 < 1  .410 .007 
 TB x TS  1, 92 61.37 < 1 .432 .007 
 BT x TS x NR  1, 92 61.37 4.35 .040 .045 
 PT x TS  1, 92 49.56 5.79 .018 .059 
 PT x TS x NR  1, 92 49.56 12.10 .001 .116 
 BT x PT x TS  1, 92 58.96 3.16 .079 .033 
  BT x PT x TS x NR   1, 92 58.96 3.94 .050 .041 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect at alpha = .05. 
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Figure 2.  Mean response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) for individual and joint tasks 
for the one-response group (A) and the two-response group (B) of Experiment 2 (error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean). 
(A) One-Response Group 
 
(B) Two-Response Group 
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Discussion 
The present results showed clear differences between the one-response group and the 
two-response group, which suggests that interpersonal switch costs depend on the number of 
responses assigned to the actors.  When there was only one response per actor, selecting the 
correct response would necessarily determine which actor to respond on that trial. Under this 
condition, there were both intra- and interpersonal switch costs.  However, note that switch 
costs were marginal in RT and were reliable in PE in the present experiment, whereas they 
were obtained reliably in RT and were marginal in PE in Experiment 1, suggesting some 
tradeoffs.  The smaller switch costs in the RT data of the present experiment might reflect a 
larger proportion of task-switch trials (50%) as compared to that in Experiment 1 (33%). 
Because RT would be faster for more frequent task transitions than for less frequent ones, 
task-switch costs would be reduced when task-switch trials occupied a larger proportion of 
trials (Logan, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2007).  This might explain why task-switch costs were 
significant in Experiment 1 but were only marginal in Experiment 2.  For the two-response 
group, there were intrapersonal switch costs but not interpersonal switch costs, which were 
consistent with our previous studies (Yamaguchi et al., 2017a, 2017b).  These outcomes 
corroborate the conclusion of Experiment 1 that the confound between actor selection and 
action selection (with one response per actor) gives rise to switch costs between actors.  This 
conclusion has an important implication as to what task representations are involved in 
performing a shared task with co-actors. 
General Discussion 
Joint task performance involves two opposing forces, division of labor and integration 
of divided components (co-representation).  Many studies of joint task performance have 
focused on the integration, but only a few studies examined the division of labor between co-
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actors (e.g., Saunders et al., 2018; Yamaguchi, Clarke, & Egan, 2018; Yamaguchi, Wall, & 
Hommel, 2018).  Previous studies have considered the integration of divided task 
components under conditions in which each actor is assigned a single response such as the 
joint Simon task (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003), whereas the division of labor is observed under 
conditions in which each actor is assigned more than one response (Yamaguchi et al. 2017b). 
In the former condition, action selection and actor selection are confounded, so selecting a 
response is sufficient and necessary to select an actor; hence, intrapersonal effects (e.g., 
Simon effect) can occur as if they were interpersonal effects.   
To test this prediction, the present study tested joint task switching that has 
demonstrated the division of labor in previous studies (Wenke et al., 2011; Yamaguchi et al., 
2017a, 2017b), but using a single response per actor with which actor selection is confounded 
with action selection.  Consistent with the prediction, task-switch costs were obtained not 
only when the same actor performed the previous trial (after go trials or when the actor 
repeated) but also when the co-actor performed it (after nogo trials or when the actor 
switched).  These results are in a sharp contrast to joint task-switching with two responses for 
each actor that only produced intrapersonal switch costs but not interpersonal switch costs.  
We consider possible cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for these outcomes. 
How is the task represented in a shared task setting? 
The results of the present study suggest that interpersonal switch costs depend on 
whether action selection is confounded by actor selection.  As there were little differences 
between the individual task and the joint task, task co-representation cannot explain the 
present findings.  A possible mechanism underlying interpersonal switch costs is that it is 
simply the response selection process that gives rise to the switch costs (Schuch & Koch, 
2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006).  When there is one response per 
actor, selecting a response is equivalent to selecting an actor.  In fact, it was necessary in the 
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present experiment that response was selected to determine whether it was the actor’s own 
trial or their partner’s trial, because there was no explicit task cue when there was one 
response per actor.  Thus, response selection should have occurred on every trial when there 
was one response per actor.  When there are two or more responses per actor, an actor cue is 
presented to indicate which actor is to perform a given trial.  In this case, actor selection 
precedes response selection, and response selection may not occur when the actor has 
determined that it is not his or her own trial but is the partner’s trial.     
There has been a variation of joint task switching, in which two actors were assigned 
two different tasks (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016), instead of two actors sharing 
two tasks as in the present study.  When the actors are assigned different tasks, task switching 
is confounded by actor switching.  Hence, task-switch costs observed under that condition 
could reflect actor-switch costs.  Indeed, both experiments of the present study showed 
slower responses after nogo (actor switch) trials than after go (actor repeat) trials.  These 
outcomes indicate that without involving task selection, actor switch could result in a cost.  
Note that the present study de-confounded between actor selection and task selection, 
allowing specifically pointing to the roles of actor selection and response selection in joint 
task switching.  
Philipp and Prinz (2010) reported a joint task in which participants responded to 
diamonds and squares by uttering their own names or the names of other individuals whose 
faces were shown on a computer screen, although the faces were irrelevant to the task.  When 
participants performed the task alone, responses were faster when the names corresponded to 
the individuals displayed on the screen than when they did not correspond. However, in a 
joint task, responses were faster when the faces on the screen matched the actor who should 
respond to the target on a given trial, not the name that had to be uttered (also see Baess & 
Prinz, 2017). Thus, Philipp and Prinz’s experiments yielded a compatibility effect between 
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stimulus and response in an individual task and a compatibility effect between stimulus and 
actor in a joint task.  Wenke et al. (2011) also reported a version of the joint flanker task in 
which each actor was assigned two responses.  They found a flanker effect when the flankers 
belonged to the actor’s own target set, but no flanker effect when the flankers belonged to the 
co-actor’s target set.  These results differed from a version of the joint flanker task in which 
each actor is assigned a single response (e.g., Atmaca et al., 2010) and produces the flanker 
effect when the flankers belong to the co-actor’s target.   
Wenke et al. (2011) proposed an actor co-representation account, according to which 
actors in a joint task represent only the fact that another actor performs a complementary task 
part and when it is the co-actor’s turn, but not what the co-actor is supposed to do.  This actor 
co-representation creates additional conflicts with actor identification (i.e., actor selection), 
making it more difficult to determine whose turn it is in a joint task setting than determining 
whether it is a go or nogo trial in an individual task.  Baess and Prinz (2015) reported 
findings consistent with the actor co-representation account.  In their study, participants were 
first presented with an actor cue, followed by a response cue that specified one of the two 
alternative responses.  The task was performed alone or with a co-actor, and the EEG 
recordings between the actor cue and the action cue revealed modulations of rapid attentional 
reactions (< 100 ms after the actor cue) in the joint task as compared to those of the 
individual task.  Although we remain neutral as to whether actor selection is more difficult 
than determining go or nogo trials, we agree with the actor co-representation account that 
actor selection and action selection are confounded when there is only one response per actor.  
Interpersonal factors would only affect actor selection, but the influence of these factors can 
lurk into action selection in such cases.   
It is also possible that interpersonal switch costs depend on the structure of cognitive 
processes underlying joint performance.  For instance, actor selection and action selection 
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may constitute two different levels of decision-making in a hierarchy.  The higher level 
decision selects an actor to perform a given trial.  This would occur in joint task switching 
when a cue indicates the actor who should perform the trial.  When there are more than one 
response assigned to each actor, actor selection is not sufficient to determine the correct 
response, so the lower level decision has to select an action that should be made to the target.  
Switch costs are obtained only if the same actor has performed the preceding trial where actor 
selection and action selection have occurred, but not if a different actor has performed the 
preceding trial where only actor selection has occurred.  However, when there is only a single 
response assigned to each actor, the lower level decision only needs to confirm the correct 
response, without the higher-level processing of selecting an actor.  Thus, response selection 
always occurs on all trials, producing intra- and interpersonal switch costs. 
Although the hierarchical model assumes that the higher-level decision requires a 
representation that integrates interpersonal factors, it is still unknown as to what factors are 
represented and how they are represented at this level.  A strong claim of the co-
representation account proposes that the co-actor’s actions are co-represented automatically 
as if they were the actor’s own actions (Knoblich et al., 2011; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006).  
Other accounts of joint performance propose that the co-actor only serves as a spatial 
reference to represent the actor’s own actions (e.g., Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, et al., 2014; 
Dittrich et al., 2013).  Dittrich, Rothe, and Klauer (2012) showed that the joint Simon effect 
was obtained only if the spatial alignment of co-actors matched the spatial alignment of 
response keys but not if they did not match.  These findings may indicate that the actors can 
be represented based on multiple features, such as their physical locations and the locations 
of assigned responses (Prinz, 2015).  Relative salience may allow one feature to dominate the 
actor representation or all features may contribute collectively.  Further investigations need to 
determine how co-actors are represented in a joint task setting. 
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Supplementary Material 
The experimental data are freely available at the project page of the Open Science 
Framework project page (https://osf.io/y497z/).  
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Table 1. Results of ANOVAs on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) in 
Experiment 1. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
  RT 
Block Type (BT)  1, 51 58,546.89 7.09 .010 .122 
Previous Trial (PT)  1, 51 11,276.09 4.67 .035 .084 
Task Sequence (TS)  2, 102 6,261.74 12.72 < .001 .200 
BT x PT  1, 51 11,333.04 2.09 .154 .039 
BT x TS  2, 102 5,830.89 2.27 .108 .043 
PT x TS  2, 102 6,703.09 3.37 .038 .062 
TB x PT x TS   2, 102 5,865.36 < 1 .458 .015 
  PE 
BT  1, 51 208.34 41.15 < .001 .447 
PT  1, 51 35.21 <1 .706 .003 
TS  2, 102 247.68 15.51 < .001 .233 
BT x PT  1, 51 33.74 < 1 .705 .003 
BT x TS  2, 102 31.50 8.74 < .001 .146 
PT x TS  2, 102 23.54 4.48 .014 .081 
BT x PT x TS   2, 102 28.87 1.68 .192 .032 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect at alpha = .05. 
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Table 2. Results of ANOVAs on Response Time (RT) and Percentage Errors (PE) in 
Experiment 2. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
   RT 
Between-subject       
 Number of Response (NR)  1, 92 23,285,027.96 182.99 < .001 .665 
Within-subject       
 Block Type (BT)  1, 92 34,923.53 3.06 .084 .032 
 BT x NR  1, 92 34,923.53 1.99 .162 .021 
 Previous Trial (PT)  1, 92 125,857.34 7.31 .008 .074 
 PT x NR  1, 92 125,857.34 < 1 .939 < .001 
 Task Sequence (TS)  1, 92 7,845.83 4.01 .048 .042 
 TS x NR  1, 92 7,845.83 < 1 .893 < .001 
 BT x PT  1, 92 9,404.55 1.41 .238 .015 
 BT x PT x NR  1, 92 9,404.55 < 1 .883 < .001 
 BT x TS  1, 92 6,419.93 < 1 .803 .001 
 BT x TS x NR  1, 92 6,419.93 < 1 .694 .002 
 PT x TS  1, 92 5,728.71 2.47 .119 .026 
 PT x TS x NR  1, 92 5,728.71 12.61 .001 .121 
 BT x PT x TS  1, 92 6,469.79 1.15 .286 .012 
  BT x PT x TS x NR   1, 92 6,469.79 5.11 .026 .053 
   PE 
Between-subject       
 Number of Response (NR)  1, 92 84,597.05 116.67 < .001 .559 
Within-subject       
 BT  1, 92 291.75 23.08 < .001 .201 
 BT x NR  1, 92 291.75 10.02 .002 .098 
 PT  1, 92 81.20 < 1 .352 .009 
 PT x NR  1, 92 81.20 2.08 .152 .022 
 TS  1, 92 82.00 21.61 < .001 .190 
 TS x NR  1, 92 82.00 4.04 .047 .042 
 BT x PT  1, 92 37.38 < 1 .614 .003 
 BT x PT x NR  1, 92 37.38 < 1  .410 .007 
 TB x TS  1, 92 61.37 < 1 .432 .007 
 BT x TS x NR  1, 92 61.37 4.35 .040 .045 
 PT x TS  1, 92 49.56 5.79 .018 .059 
 PT x TS x NR  1, 92 49.56 12.10 .001 .116 
 BT x PT x TS  1, 92 58.96 3.16 .079 .033 
  BT x PT x TS x NR   1, 92 58.96 3.94 .050 .041 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect at alpha = .05. 
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Figure 1.  Mean response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) for individual and joint tasks 
of Experiment 1 (error bars represent one standard error of the mean). 
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Figure 2.  Mean response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) for individual and joint tasks 
for the one-response group (A) and the two-response group (B) of Experiment 2 (error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean). 
(A) One-Response Group 
 
(B) Two-Response Group 
 
